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1.  INTRODUCTION
In the country with no formal constitution, where basic rights were gradually given protection by the Supreme Court before some of 
them were regulated for the first time in two Basic Laws in 1992, it 
need not be said that the problem of the constitutionalization of hor­
izontal rights is rather a matter of the doctrine and judiciary than 
that of the positive law. Israel, for this is the country we are talking 
about, has struggled to reach an agreement on the basic values of 
the State since its establishment in 1948. Facing a constant threat to 
its existence and dealing with ideological conflicts, the state has not 
yet managed to adopt a fully-fledged constitution that would directly 
refer to its application in the private sphere. 
The Israeli political system is marked by a very strong position 
of the Supreme Court. Due to an absence of action on the side of 
the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), the Court undertook the difficult 
task of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms without a proper 
constitutional framework. Hearing direct petitions against govern­
ment authorities, it ruled on issues that in western democracies are 
enshrined in formal constitutions. It was also the Supreme Court 
who put theory into practice and, by adopting the indirect application 
model, enabled the constitutional human rights to permeate into the 
private sphere. 
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This chapter begins with a general introduction to the idea of 
the horizontal application of constitutional human rights. Further, it 
presents a short outline of the Israeli constitutional history and seeks 
to find a constitutional regulation of horizontal rights in Israel. Next, 
it moves to the indirect application model as a proper theoretical 
framework for Israel, and analyzes the Kestenbaum case, in which 
this theory was put into practice for the first time by the Israeli Su­
preme Court. The subsequent sections discuss the application of 
constitutional rights by Israeli courts in the employer-employee re­
lationship, in contract law and in tort law. The chapter finishes with 
a short summary of the conclusions. 
2.  THE IDEA OF HORIZONTAL APPLICATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Traditionally, the constitutional rights of an individual are directed 
vis-a-vis the state and aimed at limiting governmental power. This ap­
proach has been an undisputable assumption for many years, also 
in Israel. 1 2The vertical application of human rights, however, does 
not necessarily make the horizontal application impossible. In 1958, 
the German Constitutional Court rendered a judgment in the Luth1 
case that opened a new era of the question of horizontal application 
of constitutional human rights. In this case, the Court differentiated 
between the subjective and objective aspect of constitutional rights. 
According to the explanation provided, the subjective aspect of a right 
is the duty imposed on the state in relation towards an individual, 
whereas the objective aspect makes that right an objective value of 
the entire legal system. 3
’ D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law-The Israeli Case" 
in J. Fedtke, D. Oliver (eds. ), Human Rights and the Private Sphere. A compara­
tive Study, New York 2007, pp. 252, 253-254. 
2 BVerfG, 15. 01. 1958 - 1 BvR 400/51; BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958). 
3 Cit. A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law” in G. Sapir, 
D. Barak-Erez, A. Barak (eds. ), Israeli Constitutional Law in the Making, Ox­
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In the 1980s, the Israeli Supreme Court began changing its at­
titude towards the notion of the application of constitutional rights 
in the private sphere. Alongside the Court’s newly discovered incli­
nation towards judicial activism, the immediate reason for this new 
approach was the progressive privatization of the public sector in Is­
rael, which shifted some powers from administrative authorities to 
private entities. This resulted in the necessity to counterbalance the 
unequal power between the actors of private law with the protection 
of human rights. 4
ford-Portland 2013, pp. 379, 388 {Hart Studies in Comparative Public Law, 
Vol. 2).
4 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, "Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 255.
5 CA 294/91, Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum, 46 (2) 
PD 464, 531 (1992). Unofficial translation into English available at chttp:// 
www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/israeli/case. 
php?id=i39i>, 16 February 2015.
6 Ibid.
The adoption of the idea of horizontal application of human 
rights in private law in Israel is customarily attributed to the Supreme 
Court Justice and President Aharon Barak, who laid out his theory on 
indirect application of constitutional human rights in his obiter dic­
tum to the Kestenbaum case5 (1992). Thus, the partial enactment of 
the bill of rights in two Basic Laws in 1992 combined with Barak’s 
theory were the major factors that enabled "the constitutionalization 
of private law” in Israel.6
3. ON THE WAY TO THE CONSTITUTION
When Israel was founded in 1948, the Declaration of Independence 
provided that the country will adopt a written democratic constitu­
tion. The elected constituency that later became the First Knesset had 
not managed to adopt one. Numerous political, social and ideological 
factors rendered reaching a compromise over the constitution impos­
sible. In 1950, the First Knesset adopted the Harari Resolution, which 
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stated that: “The Constitution shall be composed of individual chap­
ters in such a manner that each of them shall constitute a basic law 
in itself. (...) all chapters together will form the State Constitution.”7
7 Harari Resolution, 5 DK [Divrey HaKnesset = Knesset Resolutions] 1743 
(June 14, 1950). Original text in Hebrew available at <http://www.huka.gov.il/ 
wiki/makor/44.pdf>, 16 February 2015.
8 Basic Law: The Knesset, SH [Sefer HaHukim = Official Gazette] 244 (1958) 
69; Basic Law: The Government, SH 540 (1968) 226; Basic Law: The Govern­
ment, SH 1396 (1992) 214; Basic Law: The Government, SH 1780 (2001) 158; 
Basic Law: Israel Lands, SH 312 (i960) 56; Basic Law: The President of the 
State, SH 428 (1964), 118; Basic Law: The State Economy, SH 777 (1975) 206; 
Basic Law: The Army, SH 806 (1976) 154; Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Isra­
el, SH 980 (1980) 186; Basic Law: Judiciary, SH 1110 (1984) 78; Basic Law: The 
State Comptroller, SH 1237 (1988) 30.
9 HCJ 73/53, Koi Ha’am Company Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, 7 PD [Piskei Din 
= Court Decisions] 871 (1953).
10 Basic Law: Judiciary grants the Court two capacities: it shall hear appeals 
against judgments and other decisions of the District Courts (sec. 15 (b)) and, 
when sitting as a High Court of Justice, it shall hear matters in which it deems 
necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice (sec. 15 (c)).
11 G.E. Carmi, “A constitutional Court in the Absence of a Formal Consti­
tution? On the Ramifications of Appointing the Israeli Supreme Court as the 
Only Tribunal For Judicial Review”, Connecticut Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 21, No. 1 (2005), p. 74.
12 HCJ 73/53, Koi Ha’am...
Up to 1992, the Knesset had adopted 9 Basic Laws that covered 
the matter of state institutions, economy, army and Israel lands.8 9
When the Knesset was occupied with introducing the details of the 
functioning of the state, at the same time, beginning with the Koi 
Ha’am’ decision in 1953, the Israeli Supreme Court was consequent­
ly building up an ample case law on basic rights and freedoms of 
human and citizen. Acting in its capacity as the High Court of Jus­
tice,10 the Court heard direct petitions from Israeli citizens (and since 
1967 also from inhabitants of the occupied territories) who claimed 
that actions by the government authorities had infringed upon their 
rights. By granting protection to those unwritten rights, the Supreme 
Court has developed a body of judge-made law described by some 
scholars as a “judicial” or “unwritten” bill of rights.11 This bill in­
cluded inter alia: freedom of speech and press,12 freedom of assem­
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bly,1’ freedom of association,13 4 freedom of profession,15 freedom of 
movement16 and the right to equality.17
13 HCJ 148/79, Saar v. Minister of Interior and Police, 34 PD 169 (1979).
” HCJ FH 16/61, Company Register v. Kardosh, 16 PD 1209 (1962).
15 HCJ 1/49, Bejarano v. Minister of Police, 2 PD 80 (1949).
16 HCJ 111/53, Kaufman v. Minister of Interior, 7 PD 534 (1953).
17 HCJ 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance and State Comptroller, 23 (1) 
PD 693 (1969).
18 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, SH 1391 (1992) 150; Basic Law: 
Freedom of Occupation, SH 1454 (1994) 90.
19 CA 6821/93, United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49 (4) PD 
’95 (3995)·
20 Ibid., president Barak’s opinion.
21 Basic Law: Referendum, SH 2443 (2014) 400.
22 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, sec. 2, 3.
In 1992, two Basic Laws on human rights were adopted that 
regulated some of the basic rights included in the judicial bill of 
rights.18 19In 1995, in its famous Bank HaMizrahi” decision, the Israeli 
Supreme Court announced that Israel does have a constitution that 
comprises of 11 Basic Laws. The Basic Laws of 1992 have enabled the 
completion of the constitutional process by the presence of limitation 
clauses that, so Chief Justice Barak, made them superior to the ordi­
nary statutes enacted by the Knesset.20 In 2014, the newest Basic Law: 
Referendum was introduced.21
The emergence of a constitution in Israel raised the question of 
the possibility of its application on the horizontal level.
4. Searching for a constitutional regulation
ON HORIZONTAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
The scarce regulation of human rights in Israeli Basic Laws does not 
mention any type of relations between individuals nor does it contain 
any provisions on the horizontal application of constitutional rights. 
The list of protected constitutional rights includes: freedom of occu­
pation,22 the right to life, human dignity, property, liberty, freedom 
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of movement to and from Israel and the right to privacy.23 The Is­
raeli Supreme Court has broadened the scope of some of these rights 
(especially human dignity) and started to grant protection to rights 
not expressly mentioned in the Basic Law.24 Therefore, as Barak sug­
gested, the term “constitutional rights” is intended to describe rights 
expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Israeli constitution.25
23 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, sec. 2-7.
2< S. Navot, The Constitution of Israel. A Contextual Analysis, Oxford-Portland 
2014, pp. 193, 200 (Constitutional Systems of the World).
25 A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law”, p. 379.
26 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, sec. 1; Basic Law: Freedom of Oc­
cupation, sec. 1.
27 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, sec. la. This section was intro­
duced in 1994 as amended by Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
28 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, sec. 2.
In the absence of direct provisions regarding the application of 
constitutional rights on the horizontal level, a question arises: do Ba­
sic Laws contain any option that would enable those rights to be ap­
plicable to the relationships between individuals in some other way?
Both Basic Laws of 1992 contain a provision that refers to the 
basic values of the State. “Fundamental human rights in Israel are 
founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanc­
tity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these 
rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the 
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.’’26 Both Basic 
Laws also set the purpose of their regulation. Section ta of Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty reads as follows: “The purpose of this 
Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to estab­
lish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state.”27 Respectively, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation 
provides for: “The purpose of this Basic Law if to protect freedom of 
occupation, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State 
of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.”28
The revocation to the spirit of the principles of the Declaration 
of Independence and setting a purpose in the values of the State of 
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Israel as a Jewish and democratic state show that Basic Laws are in­
tended to shape the character of the Israeli society.29
29 M. Tamir, “Human Rights in Private Law: Hybridization of the Balancing 
Test” in G. Sapir, D. Barak-Erez, A. Barak (eds.), Israeli Constitutional Law..., 
pp. 401, 403.
30 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, sec. 11.
31 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, sec. 5.
32 United States Constitution, First Amendment (1791).
33 M. Cohen-Eliya, “The Israeli Case of a Transformative Constitutional­
ism” in G. Sapir, D. Barak-Erez, A. Barak (eds.), Israeli Constitutional Law..., 
PP· 173· '83·
34 A. Barak, "Constitutional Rights and Private Law”, p. 397.
On the other hand, both Basic Laws contain an application 
clause which expressly binds governmental authorities. Section 11 of 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992) provides for as fol­
lows: “All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights 
under this Basic Law.”30 Similarly, section 5 of Basic Law: Freedom 
of Occupation (1994) reads: “All governmental authorities are bound 
to respect the freedom of occupation of all Israel nationals and resi­
dents.”31 This regulation bears a resemblance to the US Constitution, 
for instance its First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law re­
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the govern­
ment for a redress of grievances.”32
Most provisions of the US Constitution have only a vertical ef­
fect. They are directed vis-a-vis the State and local government and 
do not apply to actions between individuals.33 Barak argued that the 
aforementioned provisions of the Basic Laws should not be con­
strued as ones that narrow the scope of application of those rights. 
The fact that they expressly bind the state authorities does not ex­
clude their application to the relations between private individuals. 
They should rather be construed as emphasizing the duty of public 
authorities to abide by the constitutional human rights guaranteed 
by the Basic Laws rather than excluding any other possibility of their 
application.34
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5- THE INDIRECT APPLICATION MODEL AS A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ISRAEL
Following Barak’s conclusion, a question arises as to possible models 
of application - whether these rights should apply directly to rela­
tionships between individuals or rather indirectly by influencing the 
interpretation of general clauses in private law.35 When laying out 
his theory of horizontal application of constitutional human rights, 
Barak presented four possible models of application: (1) the direct 
application model, (2) the non-application model, (3) the applica­
tion to the judiciary model, (4) the indirect application model.36 After 
elaborating on these models, he decided that the indirect application 
model is the most suitable one for the Israeli constitutional history.37
35 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law...’’, p. 256.
36 A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law", p. 380.
37 Ibid., p. 397.
38 BVerfG, 15.01.1958 - 1 BvR 400/51; BVerfGE 7,198 (1958).
39 A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law”, p. 385.
40 Ibid., pp. 386-387.
As already mentioned, the indirect application model was de­
veloped by the German Constitutional Court starting from the Lilth 
case.38 The model provides for direct application of an individual’s 
constitutional rights towards the state and indirect application to­
wards another individual. An individual does have constitutional 
rights towards the state but does not have such rights towards an­
other individual. Rights between individuals are not at the constitu­
tional but at the sub-constitutional level (statute or common law).39 
Therefore, the constitutional rights of an individual towards another 
individual apply only indirectly through interpretation of provisions 
of private law or completion of the lacunae within it in accordance 
with objective constitutional principles.40 Private law has already de­
veloped the relevant tools for the application of this model which are 
the general principles of good faith, public policy and reasonableness. 
Thus, constitutional human rights serve as a source of inspiration for 
the interpretation of these general principles and affect the balanc­
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ing between rights involved in relationships between individuals.41 
Barak also expressed his belief that the indirect application model is 
the most appropriate for accomplishing the goals of human rights, 
which are respect for equality, dignity and autonomy.42
41 A. Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law” in D. Fried­
mann, D. Barak-Erez (eds.), Human Rights in Private Law, Oxford-Portland 
2001, pp. 13,14.
42 Ibid., p. 14.
43 Ibid., p. 30.
44 Idem, "Constitutional Rights and Private Law", pp. 379, 397.
45 Μ. Tamir, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 417.
46 CA 294/91, Jerusalem Community..., supra note 5.
Barak’s concept of the indirect application model was later re­
fined towards the strengthened indirect application model. Whereas 
the direct application model creates a type of “constitutional private 
law” to provide relief for infringement of constitutional rights, the 
strengthened model takes into account the existing private law as the 
appropriate system for providing such a relief.43
The question of the horizontal application of constitutional 
rights should, however, according to Barak, be left open to the deci­
sion of the courts.44 When dealing with the application of constitu­
tional principles in private law, courts have to establish a balance test 
to weigh the constitutional values according to the circumstances of 
the case at hand.45 This interpretation opened the gates to adopt the 
indirect application model in Israeli judicial practice.
6. THE INDIRECT APPLICATION MODEL AT WORK:
THE KESTENBAUM CASE
A turning point in the horizontal application of constitutional rights 
in Israel was the case Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kes­
tenbaum46 (1992) decided by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Court 
rendered the judgment on April 30,1992, shortly after the enactment 
of the new Basic Laws dealing with human rights, but the litigation 
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had started before they were enacted. The case considered a clash 
between the contractual freedom of the Jewish Burial Society and the 
defendant’s human dignity. The central question was the relevance 
of human dignity as a ground for the invalidation of a private con­
tract under the public policy principle.47
47 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 256.
48 Kestenbaum, Editor’s synopsis, facts of the case.
49 Standard Contracts Law (1982), sec. 3 and 19, cit.: Kestenbaum, para. 13.
50 Kestenbaum, paras. 13-17.
The facts of the case indicate that the Jewish Burial Society 
signed a standard contract with Mr. Lionel Kestenbaum, a husband 
of the deceased, which incorporated the society’s regulations. One of 
them allowed only for Hebrew letters and Hebrew calendar dates to 
be inscribed on a tombstone. On that ground, the society denied the 
husband’s request who later wished to add Latin letters and Grego­
rian calendar dates on the tombstone. The husband filed a petition 
to the Jerusalem District Court in request for a declaratory judgment 
to grant him rights to engrave Latin letters and Gregorian calendar 
dates on the grave. During the proceedings, a question arose whether 
the denial constituted an infringement of human dignity as a consti­
tutional right. The District Court answered this question in affirma­
tive and nullified the provision. The Jewish Burial Society submitted 
an appeal to the Supreme Court.48
Justice Barak, who delivered the opinion to this decision, found 
the contractual provision void and based this finding on three alter­
native grounds.
(1) The provision allowing exclusively Hebrew letters on the 
tombstone was a depriving condition according to the Standard Con­
tracts Law (1982). The Law determines that a court is authorized to 
annul or vary a condition of a standard contract that “involves an un­
due disadvantage to customers or an unfair advantage to the supplier, 
likely to lead to a deprivation of customers.’’49 Barak agreed with the 
District Court’s opinion and after deeply elaborating on this matter 
he reached the conclusion that the condition requiring the exclusive 
use of Hebrew characters is “unduly disadvantageous.”50
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(2) The Burial Society is a hybrid body and as such, it is subject 
to obligations imposed by public law. This includes obeying the con­
stitutional right to human dignity. This right has to be understood 
broadly as embracing also the freedom of conscience, expression, 
and thought of the deceased, whose desire for an appropriate burial 
must be respected. The same applies to the deceased’s family.51
51 Ibid., para. 6.
52 Ibid.
55 Ibid., para. 12.
54 Ibid., para. 11.
The members of the deceased’s family have the right and the 
freedom to determine that the memory of their loved one be 
honored in a way that they deem worthy, and that they be 
granted the possibility to express their feelings towards him in 
a manner that they deem appropriate. Engraving a tombstone 
in the language that the deceased and his family spoke is an 
expression of this.52
On the other hand, in this particular situation, the society’s 
freedom of contract was enhanced by its general aim to promote the 
Hebrew language. As Barak admitted, “The value of the Hebrew lan­
guage is one of the basic principles of our legal system."53 This means 
a head-on clash with the defendant’s human dignity which requires 
establishing a balance between the public value of the Hebrew lan­
guage and human dignity. In this situation, Barak poses a question:
Is a public body exercising governmental authority, such as the 
Burial Society, authorized to significantly and severely infringe 
human dignity (i.e. of the deceased or his relatives) in order 
to promote the value of the Hebrew language? In my opinion, 
the answer to this question is in the negative. (...). In this clash 
between the Hebrew language and human dignity, the latter 
prevails.54
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(3) The third ground for nullifying the provision of the contract 
is the implementation of the indirect application model. Barak ex­
pressed his belief that he would have reached the same conclusion, 
had the Burial Society been an entirely private body.55 The provision 
allowing exclusively Hebrew letters on the tombstone infringed 
upon the claimant’s constitutional right to human dignity through 
the concept of public policy. The separation between the public and 
private law shall not be understood as one that does not allow any in­
teractions between them. Therefore, the application of constitutional 
human rights should not be limited exclusively to public law.56 “It 
should seem clear and obvious that the basic principles of the legal 
system in general, and basic human rights in particular, are not lim­
ited to public law. (...) Indeed, the basic principles are basic to the en­
tire system, and not to the public law alone.”57 Constitutional human 
rights apply also in private law. They are not intended to protect only 
from the state, but impose such a duty on individuals as well. Every 
individual is obliged to respect these rights in relations with another 
individuals. This obligation, however, has a different scope than obli­
gation imposed on the state.58
55 Ibid., para. 18.
56 Ibid., para. 20.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., para. 22.
59 Ibid.
Obviously, the government’s obligations are stricter, and the 
protection of human rights from violation by government is 
more extensive. Indeed, the obligation of an individual to re­
spect his neighbor’s rights stems from the same source as that 
of the government’s obligation - the basic social concepts and 
the basic legal principles that the legal system is built upon.59
However, constitutional human rights do not apply directly. The 
principles of the system in general and human rights in particular 
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flow to private law and they are transferred to interactions between 
individuals through the tools of private law doctrines.60
60 A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law”, p. 398.
61 Kestenbaum, para. 27.
62 Ibid., para. 30.
63 Ibid., Editor’s synopsis, facts of the case.
64 M. Tamir, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 406.
65 CA 312/74, Cables and Electric Threads Company v. Kristianpoler, 29 (1) PD 
316 (1974).
By applying the indirect application model Barak came to the 
conclusion that the claimant’s right to human dignity permeated to 
contract law through the public policy concept. According to this con­
cept, an appropriate balance has to be found between the freedom 
of contract and human dignity. In this particular case, the constitu­
tional right to human dignity outweighed the freedom of contract.61 
For these reasons, the condition incorporated to the contract was con­
trary to the public policy and therefore void. The appeal of the Jew­
ish Burial Society was to be dismissed.62 During the hearing at the 
Supreme Court, the society agreed to the engraving of the dates of 
birth and death in numerals, but only on the back of the tombstone.63 64
Kestenbaum is a breakthrough in implementing the indirect 
application model. The case marks the recognition of the impact of 
human rights on private law in Israel.54
7. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Long before developing the horizontal rights concept in Israel, the 
main basis for examining claims between individuals was the pub­
lic policy clause. The case Cables and Electric Threads Company 
v. Kristianpoler65 (1974) dealt with the non-compete agreement. 
The Supreme Court established that restrictions put on the former 
employee in such an agreement must comply with two conditions: 
(1) necessity to protect the legitimate interest of the employer and 
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(2) compatibility with the public interest.66 The concept of the public 
policy was not defined by law and was subject to courts’ interpreta­
tion.67 According to Barak’s definition, public policy means “the main 
values, principles and interests that a given society wish to maintain 
in a given time.”68
66 Kristianpoler, cit.: M. Tamir, ‘Human Rights in Private Law...’, p. 405.
67 M. Tamir, "Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 405.
68 A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, Haifa 2004, p. 259, cit.: M. Tamir, 
"Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 405.
69 M. Tamir, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 405.
70 Kestenbaum, para. 22.
71 CA 6601/96, AES System Inc v. Saar, 54 (3) PD 850, 860 (2000).
72 AES System Inc v. Saar, cit: M. Tamir, “Human Rights in Private Law”, 
p. 405.
As a result of the adoption of the indirect application model 
in Israel, constitutional rights also influenced also the employer- 
-employee relationship. The basic right of freedom of occupation 
changed the character of the public policy concept.69 In Kestenbaum, 
Barak mentioned that “not only the government is obliged to respect 
the human right of freedom of occupation, but employers, too, must 
respect the freedom of occupation of their employees.”70
The new approach can be seen in the AES System Inc v. Saar 
case71 (2000). Similarly as before, the Court found a non-compete 
agreement void as it contradicted the public policy, but as a result of 
the impact of the basic right of freedom of occupation, the public pol­
icy changed its character. The requirements set by the Court for such 
a contradiction were less strict than before because the rights of the 
employee were strengthened by the constitutionally protected free­
dom of occupation. This case set a new threshold for non-compete 
agreements: from now on, the options to restrict employees’ rights 
after termination of work were much more limited.72
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8. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTRACT LAW
Prior to the enactment of the partial bill of rights in 1992, it was 
the Supreme Court who ruled on granting the protection to human 
rights, building up the judicial bill of rights. In case a private con­
tract infringed upon those rights, the Court would use the principle 
of public policy to invalidate them.73 When such a right was infringed 
in the precontractual stage, the Court would use the good faith prin­
ciple.74
73 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 254.
73 Ibid., p. 261.
75 HCJ FH 22/82, Beit Yules v. Raviv (1982), 43 (1) PD 441.
76 Beit Yules v. Raviv, cit.: A. Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Pri­
vate Law", p. 40.
77 Beit Yules v. Raviv, cit.: D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Pri­
vate Law...”, p. 261.
78 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 262.
The first time the Court dealt with the possibility of application 
of the right to equality in the precontractual phase was in Beit Yules 
v. Raviv75 (1982). In this case the question was raised whether the duty 
to act in good faith obliges a private tender to equal treatment of the 
bidders. The majority followed the traditional concept of contractual 
autonomy and ruled that the principle of good faith does not require 
equal treatment and does not prohibit discrimination, regardless of 
circumstances.76 The minority believed that the duty of equal treat­
ment was implied by the principle of good faith which applies also to 
the precontractual stage.77 Although the majority opinion set a prec­
edent, the minority opinion was of a great importance for the future 
developments of horizontal application of human rights in private 
law in Israel. It was delivered by two most prominent Justices of the 
Supreme Court - Meir Shamgar (the President) and Aharon Barak 
(his successor in the office). Their argumentation gave hope that in 
the case of a forbidden form of group discrimination, the Court may 
reach a different result.78
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Since 1992, according to Barak, the dictum of Beit Yules is not 
relevant anymore, as equality is now protected by the human dignity 
clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.79 For those 
reasons, it must find expression in private law.80 In the following cas­
es, the lower courts in Israel have ruled that equality can be used in 
the precontractual stage as a tool to enforce the closing of a contract 
when a party refused to enter it for discriminatory reasons.81 These 
decisions show the Israeli courts’ openness to apply constitutional 
human rights in private law.82
79 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, sec. 2.
80 A. Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law”, p. 40.
81 D. Barak-Erez, 1. Gilead, “Human Rights in Private Law...’’, p. 261.
82 Ibid., p. 262.
81 CC (Jm) 11258/93, Na’amne v. Kibbutz Kalia, ruled on September 1, 1996 
(unpublished), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
88 Na’amne v. Kibbutz Kalia, cit.: ACRI - The Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel, Comments on the Combined Initial and First Periodic Reports Concerning 
the Implementation of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (IC- 
CPR), submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, July 1998, 
p. 134.
85 CC (TA) 15/97, Shamsiyan v Rosemary Garden Rest, ruled on 12 January 
1999 (unpublished), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription).
In Na’amne v. Kibbutz Kalia83 (1996), the Jerusalem Magistrate 
Court dealt with racially-based discrimination against an Israeli-Ar­
ab family who was denied entry to a private water resort. The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded a modest compensation of 
10,000 NIS (ca. 2,600 USD). The court provided two bases for the 
defendant’s liability - a tortious and a precontractual one. In terms 
of breach of precontractual liability, the Court based its ruling on the 
finding that media advertisements to visit the park constituted a good 
faith offer as they were directed at the general public. Denying entry 
stood for a cancellation of the offer at the last minute and violated the 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealings.84
Precontractual liability was also the subject of the decision in 
Shamsiyan v. Rosemary Garden Rest85 (1999). The case dealt with 
a situation in which a disabled woman was denied entry to a bar. Tel 
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Aviv Magistrate Court ruled that this case involved intentional dis­
crimination against a disabled person which constituted a breach of 
good faith.86 Another discrimination case was decided by the Haifa 
Magistrate Court. In Association for the Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals v. Matzkin87 (1996) the Court ruled that an individual 
cannot be required to disclose his or her sexual orientation when 
looking for an apartment to rent.88
86 Shamsiyan v Rosemary Garden Rest, cit.: M. Cohen-Eliya, “The Israeli 
Case...”, p. 184.
87 CC (Ha) 4583/96, Association for the Protection of the Rights of Individu­
als v. Matzkin, ruled on 23 April 1996 (unpublished), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription).
88 Association for the Protection of the Rights of Individuals v. Matzkin, cit.: 
M. Cohen-Eliya, “The Israeli Case...”, p. 184.
89 M. Cohen-Eliya, “The Israeli Case...”, p. 183.
90 D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead,’’Human Rights in Private Law...”, p. 263.
91 Ibid., p. 254.
Those cases were deeply influenced by the notion of the appli­
cation of constitutional rights on the horizontal level and they show 
that the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom 
had an impact on private law.89
9. Application of constitutional human rights
IN TORT LAW
The application of constitutional rights is even more relevant in tort 
law than in contract law. Tort law is equipped with appropriate tools 
for this purpose which are the general framework of breach of stat­
utory duty as well as the concepts of carelessness and duty of care in 
negligence.90 In Israel, the general regulation of tort law was intro­
duced with the Civil Wrong Ordinance which provides for a defini­
tion of a damage. This definition is broad enough to include different 
harms caused by an infringement of constitutional human rights. 
A number of rights that later became a part of the Basic Laws of 1992 
were named expressly in different statutory provisions.91 These in­
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elude bodily integrity (protected by general and specific torts within 
the concepts of negligence, breach of statutory duty and strict liabi­
lity), dignity (protected i.a. by defamation law), privacy (protected by 
law on the protection of privacy) and property (protected by general 
and specific torts such as trespassing, conversion and passing off), to 
name a few.92
92 Ibid., and further references.
91 Ibid., p. 264.
9* CA 2781/93, Da'aka v. Carmel Hospital 53(4) PD 526 (1999).
95 Da'aka v. Carmel Hospital, cit.: D. Barak-Erez, I. Gilead, "Human Rights 
in Private Law...”, p. 266.
96 ACRI, Comments on the Combined..., p. 134.
The Israeli Supreme Court has rejected the idea of adopting the 
direct application model in tort law. The direct application of new Ba­
sic Laws would enable the plaintiff to sue on both counts: a traditional 
tort claim and a constitutional claim for infringement of the protect­
ed constitutional right (for example, defamation and violation of the 
right to dignity). It was feared that the adoption of this model would 
lead to the creation of a “constitutional law of torts” which would ex­
ist alongside the statutory tort law. Besides that, constitutional rights 
are not detailed enough and do not specify elements required to es­
tablish tortious liability.93 The Supreme Court has rejected the direct 
application model in the Da’aka v. Carmel Hospital94 (1999) case. In­
stead of applying the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty directly, 
it imposed liability on the basis of the tort of negligence, inspired by 
the value of autonomy protected in this Basic Law and thus applying 
it indirectly.95
In the previously mentioned Na’amne case, the Court provided 
remedy on both contractual and tortious basis for liability. As far as 
the tortious basis for liability is concerned, the ruling was an indirect 
application of constitutional rights. The court ruled that the denial 
constituted a breach of statutory duty because it violated the obli­
gation of a private institution to respect the right to human dignity, 
which includes the right not to be humiliated on the basis of national 
origin.96
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The adoption of the indirect application model of the new Basic 
Laws has strengthened the protection of rights provided by tort law.
IO. CONCLUSION
In this chapter an attempt was made to present briefly the question 
of horizontal application of human rights in Israel. In Israeli consti­
tution, there are no provisions relating to this matter. This concept 
was developed in the scholarship and confirmed by case law of the 
Israeli courts. Barak’s theory of the indirect application model was 
based on the German Constitutional Court ruling in the Lüth case. 
As a matter of fact, Israeli doctrine and judiciary follows the German 
Drittwirkung (impact on third parties) model.97 This model has been 
recognized in all fields of private law in Israel.98
97 M. Cohen-Eliya, “The Israeli Case...”, p. 183.
98 A. Barak, “Constitutional Rights and Private Law”, p. 398.
In most countries, some of the relationships between private 
actors are addressed explicitly in the constitution and the analysis 
concentrates on the question whether they do apply in real life and 
whether the courts enforce their application. In Israel, the situation 
is the exact opposite. At the beginning, there was no constitution, 
and when it finally emerged - and this had not happened until the Is­
raeli Supreme Court so decided - it did not address any relationships 
between individuals. But the fact that something was not inscribed in 
laws does not necessarily imply that something does not exist. The 
creativity of the Israeli judges, and especially that of the Justices of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, has rendered it possible to put the Pres­
ident Aharon Barak’s concept of the indirect application of constitu­
tional human rights into practice. The courts went even further. The 
scarcity of constitutional regulation on human rights did not provide 
protection to a number of rights that are a standard in traditional 
bills of rights. Is it possible for something that does not exist in pos­
itive law to be enforceable? The Supreme Court has answered this 
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question in the affirmative in many cases when it granted protection 
to rights not explicitly mentioned in the Basic Laws, by broadening 
their scope far beyond what is perhaps even thinkable in Western de­
mocracies. In this manner, the Israeli Supreme Court has built and 
still builds up a catalogue of constitutional human rights and then 
applies them in the private sphere, being a good role model to lower 
Israeli courts. A perfect example of judicial law-making. A true mas­
tery of constitutional argument, indeed.
STRESZCZENIE
Zagadnienie konstytucjonalizacji stosunków między podmiotami prywat­
nymi w Izraelu sprowadza się w głównej mierze do doktryny i orzecznic­
twa. Podejmując próbę znalezienia konstytucyjnej regulacji stosunków ho­
ryzontalnych, napotyka się w pierwszej kolejności na przeszkodę w postaci 
braku konstytucji formalnej, która zawierałaby takie przepisy. Mimo zapo­
wiedzi zawartej w Deklaracji Niepodległości z 1948 r., Izrael do dziś nie 
ma konstytucji w formie jednego dokumentu o szczególnej randze i su­
premacji normatywnej. System konstytucyjny Izraela opiera się na 12 usta­
wach zasadniczych. Kiedy izraelski parlament zajmował się regulowaniem 
kwestii ustrojowych, Sąd Najwyższy obejmował ochroną poszczególne pra­
wa, które w państwach demokratycznych zakorzenione są w konstytucjach, 
i w ten sposób tworzył ich niepisany katalog. W 1992 r. Kneset uchwalił 
dwie ustawy zasadnicze stanowiące wąską regulację niektórych praw pod­
stawowych. O tym, że Izrael ma konstytucję, zadecydował w 1995 r. Sąd 
Najwyższy, orzekając, że to właśnie ustawy z 1992 r. pozwoliły na dokoń­
czenie procesu kształtowania konstytucji.
Regulacja konstytucyjna nie zawiera żadnej wzmianki o stosunkach 
horyzontalnych. Trudno też doszukać się jakichkolwiek wskazówek mię­
dzy słowami. Dodatkowo, obie ustawy nakładają wyraźne zobowiązanie na 
wszelkie organy państwowe do poszanowania praw w nich chronionych. 
Wybitny izraelski konstytucjonalista, były sędzia i prezes Sądu Najwyż­
szego Aharon Barak uznał, że takie sformułowanie nie wyklucza możli­
wości stosowania konstytucyjnych praw człowieka do stosunków między 
podmiotami prawa prywatnego. Wzorując się na niemieckiej doktrynie 
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po raz pierwszy wyłożonej w orzeczeniu w sprawie Liith, Barak stworzył 
model pośredniego stosowania tych praw i dostosował go do izraelskiej 
rzeczywistości konstytucyjnej. Po raz pierwszy model ten został zastoso­
wany w sprawie Kestenbaum, która dotyczyła konfliktu pomiędzy prawem 
do godności ludzkiej a swobodą kontraktowania. Sporządzający opinię 
główną Barak argumentował, że podstawowe zasady systemu prawne­
go, a w szczególności prawa człowieka, nie są ograniczone do prawa pu­
blicznego. Są one podstawowymi zasadami całego systemu prawnego. 
W relacjach między podmiotami prywatnymi zasady te nie są stosowane 
bezpośrednio, lecz przenikają do prawa prywatnego i wpływają na te re­
lacje poprzez doktryny prawa prywatnego, takie jak dobra wiara, rozsądek 
i klauzula porządku publicznego. Rozstrzygając tę sprawę, Sąd orzekł, że 
jeśli przepis ustawy narusza godność ludzką, to taki przepis podlega unie­
ważnieniu, ponieważ godność ludzka jest dobrem większym niż swoboda 
kontraktowania.
Wyrok w sprawie Kestenbaum był punktem zwrotnym w zaadop­
towaniu modelu pośredniego stosowania konstytucyjnych praw człowie­
ka w prawie prywatnym. Za ustanowionym w nim precedensie podążyły 
izraelskie sądy niższych instancji. I tak w relacjach między pracodawcami 
a pracownikami prawa człowieka znalazły zastosowanie poprzez klauzulę 
porządku publicznego. Chroniona konstytucyjnie wolność wykonywania 
zawodu wpłynęła na zawieranie umów o zakazie konkurencji po ustaniu 
stosunku pracy w ten sposób, że przy sporządzaniu takich umów należy 
wyważyć pomiędzy potrzebą ochrony uzasadnionego interesu pracodaw­
cy a interesem publicznym w utrzymaniu wolności wykonywania zawodu 
przez byłego pracownika. Prawa człowieka wywarły również istotny wpływ 
na odpowiedzialność przedumowną, w szczególności na polu dyskrymina­
cji skutkującej odmową zawarcia umowy. Sąd uznał, że zasada równości 
stanowi element godności ludzkiej i jako taka podlega ochronie konstytu­
cyjnej. Odmowa zawarcia umowy nosząca znamię dyskryminacji jest na­
ruszeniem zasady równości, która znajduje zastosowanie poprzez koncept 
dobrej wiary, do jakiej zobowiązane są podmioty zmierzające do zawarcia 
umowy. Zastosowanie konstytucyjnych praw człowieka na polu odpowie­
dzialności z tytułu czynów niedozwolonych jest możliwe poprzez koncep­
cję naruszenia obowiązku ustawowego, obowiązku zachowania należytej 
staranności i niedbalstwo. Prawa chronione na poziomie ustawowym zo­
stają wzmocnione przez pośrednie stosowanie praw konstytucyjnych.
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Brak regulacji stosunków horyzontalnych w konstytucji nie oznacza, 
że prawa człowieka nie znajdują zastosowania do relacji między podmio­
tami indywidualnymi w Izraelu. Poprzez adaptację modelu pośredniego 
stosowania prawa te przenikają w sferę prawa prywatnego i wzmacniają 
prawa gwarantowane na poziomie ustawowym. Decydującą rolę w tym 
procesie odgrywa izraelski Sąd Najwyższy, który poprzez swoje orzecznic­
two gwarantował i nadal gwarantuje ochronę praw podstawowych od sa­
mego początku istnienia państwa.
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